The Great Erasure: How Beijing’s ‘Sinicization’ Campaign Is Remaking Islam in China

BEIJING — For centuries, the architectural landscape of China’s Muslim-majority districts was a vibrant tapestry of Middle Eastern influence, marked by soaring minarets, gilded domes, and intricate Arabic calligraphy. From the ancient Silk Road outposts in the west to the bustling neighborhoods of the capital, these structures served as more than just places of worship; they were cultural anchors that connected Chinese Muslims to a global faith tradition. But today, that landscape is undergoing a radical, state-mandated transformation that is effectively erasing the visual and structural identity of Islam from the Chinese map.

This nationwide campaign, officially dubbed “Sinicization,” has moved beyond the regional focus on Xinjiang and into the heartland of China’s diverse Islamic communities. It is a massive, highly coordinated project that seeks to harmonize all religious practice with the political orthodoxy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the Grand Mosque of Shadian—long regarded as the jewel of the nation’s Islamic architecture—undergoes a total, state-ordered architectural makeover, the message from Beijing is unambiguous: in the modern Chinese state, there is no room for symbols of faith that do not carry the stamp of nationalistic, secular allegiance.

The Architecture of Submission: Dismantling the Minarets

The physical changes sweeping across China are profound in their clinical, bureaucratic precision. In provinces such as Yunnan, Ningxia, and Gansu, the government has embarked on a systematic removal of “foreign” architectural elements. Minarets, the iconic towers from which the call to prayer is traditionally broadcast, are being razed. Domes, once the hallmark of mosque design, are being replaced with pagoda-style roofs or flat, modernist facades that blend into the surrounding civic architecture.

In the historic Shadian district, the Grand Mosque—a massive, sprawling complex that once stood as a testament to the influence of the Hui Muslim community—has been completely remade. Its towering minarets are gone, its domes have been leveled, and its walls have been stripped of the intricate Arabic script that once adorned them. For the local population, the change is a visible, daily reminder of the state’s absolute authority over the spiritual realm.

This process, which officials refer to as “rectification,” is not limited to physical structures. It extends to the very rituals of faith. Across the country, mosque leaders are being mandated to replace traditional religious iconography with images of state officials, slogans promoting party loyalty, and mandates to preach the “Sinicized” version of religious texts, which emphasizes harmony with socialist values over literal theological interpretation.

Sinicization: The Ideological Framework

The theoretical justification for this campaign is embedded in the CCP’s vision of national unity. President Xi Jinping has frequently called for religions to be “Chinese in orientation,” a directive that the party interprets as the requirement for faith to be subservient to the state. The CCP’s concern is that any international religious identity—whether it be the Catholic Church’s connection to the Vatican or the Islamic world’s ties to the Middle East—represents a potential “fifth column” that could challenge the absolute power of the party.

“Sinicization is about ensuring that the soul of China remains Chinese,” says a policy advisor familiar with the party’s religious affairs bureau. “Faith cannot be allowed to create divisions or allegiances that exist outside the party’s framework. By stripping away foreign, ‘alien’ influences, we are protecting the stability and the modernization of our society.”

This framework operates on the premise that religious identity is inherently in competition with state identity. By “rectifying” mosques, the state is effectively claiming ownership of the individual’s conscience. If a building does not look Chinese, if a sermon does not emphasize socialist development, or if a ritual does not promote national cohesion, then it is marked as a threat to be managed or eliminated.

The Hui and the Paradox of Compliance

Unlike the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, who have faced the most extreme forms of state-sanctioned detention and surveillance, the Hui Muslims—who are ethnically Chinese—have historically been viewed by the party as more “integrated” into the national fabric. This is precisely why the current campaign against them is so striking. By targeting the Hui, the state is demonstrating that no community, regardless of their historical loyalty or linguistic identity, is exempt from the mandate of total ideological submission.

For many Hui, the campaign has created a profound crisis of faith. They are being forced to navigate a precarious path: demonstrating enough loyalty to satisfy local party cadres while attempting to preserve the core tenets of their faith in private. The “dramatic climax” of the current crackdown has pushed this paradox to the breaking point. Many mosque leaders are now forced to function as party agents, monitoring the congregation, moderating sermons, and ensuring that no “radical” ideas are introduced under the guise of religious practice.

The International Response: Silence and Complexity

The international community’s reaction to the Sinicization campaign has been notably fractured. While human rights organizations and several Western governments have condemned the destruction of religious heritage as a form of “cultural genocide,” the response from Islamic-majority nations has been largely muted. Many of these nations, heavily dependent on Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative, have opted to prioritize their economic relationships with Beijing over the concerns of their co-religionists in China.

This silence has only emboldened the Chinese state. With no significant external leverage to check its actions, Beijing has proceeded with the “rectification” of mosques at an accelerated pace. The campaign, which was once debated behind the closed doors of the party congress, is now an open, aggressive reality that shows no signs of abating.

The Future of Faith in the Modern Autocracy

What does this aggressive new state apparatus mean for the future of faith in China? The answer, according to most experts, is that the state is not looking to eliminate Islam entirely, but rather to convert it into a hollow, state-sanctioned performance of religion. It is a process of “theological containment.”

Under this model, the mosque remains open, but its purpose is radically transformed. It is no longer a site of community building, social criticism, or spiritual sanctuary. It is a venue for the propagation of state ideology, a place where the faithful are taught to prioritize the party’s current five-year plan over their traditional religious duties. The ultimate goal is to sever the connection between Chinese Muslims and the global Islamic community, creating a localized, domesticated form of belief that poses zero risk to the party’s hegemony.

A Landscape Transformed

As the Grand Mosque of Shadian continues to operate under its new, “Sinicized” identity, it serves as a powerful symbol of the current state of religious freedom in China. The building may still stand, but the spirit of the place has been fundamentally altered.

The campaign has successfully created a landscape of surveillance and forced conformity that is nearly impossible to evade. By erasing the visual markers of Islamic identity, Beijing has made clear that its authority is absolute. The question of whether this will result in the long-term suppression of faith or, alternatively, the creation of a deeply disillusioned and alienated population remains an open one.

However, for now, the silence of the minarets and the uniformity of the architecture speak for themselves. The state has decided that in its race toward total modernization and absolute control, the diversity of China’s cultural fabric is a liability that must be trimmed. The result is a nation that is becoming undeniably more uniform, more controlled, and, by the state’s own metric, more “harmonious.” But whether that harmony can endure in a society that is being forced to forget its own past remains the central, looming question for the future of the Chinese state.

As the Sinicization campaign continues to unfold across the country, we will continue to monitor the architectural and ideological shifts occurring within China’s diverse religious communities.

Do you believe that Beijing’s policy of Sinicization is a necessary tool for maintaining national security in a diverse state, or is it an unjustifiable assault on religious and cultural freedom?