Delta Force ACTIVATED For Iran Invasion – Spy HUNT Underway

Trump Weighs Iran Military Options as Special Operations Forces Loom Over Nuclear Standoff

WASHINGTON — President Donald Trump is weighing a new set of military options for Iran, including the possible use of elite American special operations forces to secure highly enriched uranium buried deep inside the country, according to a report cited by regional officials and U.S. observers tracking the escalating crisis.

The discussions come as Washington and Israel prepare for the possibility that combat operations against Iran could resume as early as next week, potentially under a new operational name. The planning reflects growing concern inside the administration that the current ceasefire may be temporary, that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains unwilling to accept a lasting deal, and that Tehran may be using the pause to regroup, harden its defenses and protect nuclear material.

Among the most dramatic options under consideration is a ground mission involving elite American units such as Delta Force or Navy SEAL Team 6, according to the report. Such forces are trained for high-risk operations involving weapons of mass destruction, hostage rescues, counterterrorism raids and the recovery of sensitive materials. In this case, the target would reportedly be Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, believed to be stored or protected at heavily fortified nuclear facilities.

The idea of sending U.S. troops into Iran marks a sharp escalation from airstrikes and naval blockades. While American bombers and missiles can destroy runways, radar sites, missile batteries and weapons depots, recovering nuclear material from underground sites would require a far more complex operation. It could involve not only special operations teams but also thousands of support personnel, aircraft, intelligence assets, medical evacuation teams, engineers and conventional troops to secure the perimeter.

Military officials have long understood the risks of such a mission. A raid inside Iran would carry the possibility of American casualties, direct combat with Iranian troops and a wider regional war. It would also represent one of the most dangerous U.S. military operations in the Middle East in years.

Still, the fact that the option is being discussed suggests the administration is preparing for scenarios beyond bombing. According to the report, several hundred U.S. special operations forces were deployed to the Middle East in March, partly to give the president flexibility if he chose to pursue a ground option. Their presence does not mean a raid is imminent, but it does mean the capability is closer at hand.

The possible target most frequently discussed is the nuclear infrastructure near Isfahan, where Iran has long maintained critical facilities connected to uranium processing and nuclear research. If highly enriched uranium is buried deep underground, airstrikes may damage access points but not guarantee the material’s removal or destruction. That uncertainty is what makes a ground mission both tempting and dangerous.

In such an operation, American airpower would likely first establish control of the skies. Special operations aviation units could move assault teams into position, while fighter aircraft, drones and surveillance planes monitored Iranian troop movements. Conventional forces — potentially including Army airborne units, Marines or other rapid-response formations — could be tasked with creating a security perimeter. Only then would the most specialized teams move toward the nuclear material itself.

The challenge would not end with entry. The teams would need to identify, secure and remove radioactive or sensitive material under extreme pressure. They would have to do so while avoiding contamination, defending against counterattacks and extracting before Iranian reinforcements could arrive in overwhelming numbers.

For that reason, even officials who support a tougher stance toward Iran view a ground raid as a last resort. It is a mission that could succeed tactically while opening the door to unpredictable strategic consequences.

Iran appears to be taking the threat seriously. State television recently aired instructional footage showing civilians how to handle an AK-style rifle, including how to operate the safety and chamber a round. The broadcast struck many outside observers as unusual, even surreal, given Tehran’s long-standing fear of armed dissent among its own population.

The Iranian regime has historically limited civilian access to firearms, in part because its leaders have feared that weapons could be turned against the government during protests or unrest. That makes any public effort to familiarize civilians with small arms politically revealing. It suggests that officials in Tehran are worried not only about foreign attack but also about internal instability if U.S. or Israeli operations resume.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, remains central to that concern. The force has expanded its influence over Iran’s security state and has been portrayed by U.S. officials as the most hard-line element of the Iranian system. American analysts believe the IRGC has little interest in a broad compromise with Washington, particularly if such a deal requires Iran to surrender highly enriched uranium or accept severe limits on its military infrastructure.

That hard-line posture has made diplomacy difficult. While back-channel contacts and regional mediation have continued, the military track is moving in parallel. The Trump administration has reportedly been presented with options that range from renewed bombing campaigns to more aggressive raids on Iranian military and nuclear targets.

The possibility of targeted strikes against senior IRGC figures has also been discussed by commentators and analysts following the conflict. Such a move would be intended to weaken the faction believed to be driving Iran’s resistance. But it would also carry the risk of retaliation against U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria, the Gulf and beyond.

At the same time, Washington is pursuing another front in the conflict: counterintelligence.

The FBI has renewed attention on Monica Witt, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence specialist accused of defecting to Iran and providing sensitive information to Tehran. Federal authorities have offered a reward for information leading to her capture. Witt has been charged with helping Iranian intelligence target former colleagues and compromise U.S. operations.

Her case has become newly relevant as tensions with Iran rise. Former intelligence officials have warned that any conflict with Tehran will not be fought only with aircraft, ships and missiles. It will also involve espionage, cyber operations, insider threats and attempts to identify American networks inside the country.

Witt’s alleged betrayal remains one of the more damaging Iran-related counterintelligence cases in recent memory. She is accused of revealing information about U.S. intelligence personnel and programs after traveling to Iran and working with Iranian officials. For American national security agencies, the case is a reminder that military action abroad can be complicated by intelligence losses years in the making.

The hunt for Witt also carries symbolic weight. In moments of conflict, governments often focus public attention on defectors, spies and alleged traitors. Doing so reinforces the sense that the threat is not only external but internal — that hostile governments are actively trying to penetrate, manipulate or weaken the United States from within.

Beyond the intelligence fight, unusual regional movements are adding to the sense that another round of conflict may be approaching. Reports of Russian flights moving between Somalia and the United Arab Emirates have fueled speculation that Moscow may be repositioning or evacuating personnel ahead of renewed hostilities. Russia maintains a significant presence across parts of Africa and has long-standing ties in the region, making such movements notable even if their purpose remains unclear.

Similar activity reportedly occurred before earlier phases of the conflict, when foreign governments moved personnel and assets out of vulnerable areas. Such flights are not proof that war is imminent, but they are the kind of signal analysts watch closely when tensions are high.

There have also been reports of increased fighter jet activity over Iraq and near Erbil, where the United States maintains an important military presence. Iraq has often served as both a staging ground and a pressure point in U.S.-Iran confrontations. American troops there remain vulnerable to Iranian-backed militia attacks, and any renewed campaign against Iran could quickly draw Iraqi airspace, bases and political leaders into the crisis.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy is adjusting its posture. The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford has returned home after an unusually long deployment that included operations tied to the Middle East. The carrier had previously been involved in high-profile missions before being sent toward the region as tensions with Iran intensified. Its return marks the end of a demanding deployment for thousands of sailors, but it does not mean the U.S. military presence in the region is shrinking in any meaningful way.

Other American naval assets remain positioned around the Gulf, Arabian Sea and nearby waters. The administration has continued to enforce pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Iran, for its part, has signaled that it intends to unveil a new system for controlling maritime traffic through the strait.

According to Iranian officials cited in the transcript, Tehran is preparing a designated route system that would benefit commercial ships and countries cooperating with Iran. The plan would also reportedly include charges for specialized services. In practice, critics argue, such a system could function like a toll or political screening mechanism for ships moving through Hormuz.

Washington has rejected Iran’s claim to control transit in that way. For the United States, freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is a core strategic interest. A large share of the world’s oil moves through those waters, and any attempt by Tehran to restrict, tax or threaten shipping could have immediate effects on global energy markets.

That is why the crisis around Iran is about more than nuclear material. It is also about who controls the flow of oil, who can enforce rules at sea and whether a regional power under heavy sanctions can use geography as leverage against the global economy.

For Trump, the decision ahead is difficult. Renewed airstrikes could degrade Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure but may not solve the problem of buried uranium. A ground operation could offer a more direct solution but would carry greater risk. Waiting could preserve diplomatic space but might allow Iran to harden its position.

The administration’s supporters argue that overwhelming pressure is the only language Tehran understands. They say the IRGC will not surrender its most valuable assets unless it believes the alternative is destruction. Critics counter that talk of ground operations risks pulling the United States into another open-ended Middle Eastern war, one with no guarantee of a clean exit.

Both sides understand that the next move could define the conflict.

For now, the military machinery is in place, the intelligence hunt is active, the maritime standoff is intensifying and Iran appears to be preparing its public for darker possibilities. Whether these signals lead to renewed strikes, a special operations raid, a diplomatic breakthrough or a wider war remains uncertain.

But the direction of events is unmistakable. The ceasefire is fragile. The nuclear question is unresolved. The Strait of Hormuz remains contested. And the Trump administration is now weighing options that could move the confrontation from air and sea into the heart of Iranian territory.